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Service of Process by Mail 
Effective service of process notifies a defendant of proceedings 
instituted against him and vests a court with personal jurisdiction over 
him.1 Use of the mails to serve process has expanded steadily since 
1927, when the Supreme Court upheld a Massachusetts nonresident 
motorist service of process statute permitting service by mail. 2 
While ordinarily limited to nonresidents, service by mail is allowed 
today in most states on certain resident defendants as well,3 and at 
least one state has authorized such service on all defendants.4 
Nearly all statutes authorizing service by mail require the use of 
registered or certified mail, 5 although statutes vary considerably with 
respect to directions for effecting delivery and requirements regard-
ing proof of delivery.6 Frequently, service by mail is valid only if 
1. For a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant must 
receive notification of the proceedings in a manner that satisfies the constitutional due 
process standards, and, in addition, he must have sufficient contacts with the forum 
state so that it would not be unfair to require him to defend there. See International 
Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Gray v. American Radiator & Std., Sani-
tary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
2. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). The District of Columbia, the Virgin 
Islands, and all states except Alaska permit service by mail on nonresident motorists 
where use of local highways gives rise to claims against them. See Fox, Non-
Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts, 33 F.R.D. 151 (1963). See also Annot., 
73 A.L.R.2d 1351 (1960); Annot., 138 A.L.R. 1464 (1942). FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) 
allows service by mail in federal district courts to the extent that it is authorized by 
court rule or statute of the state in which the district court sits. BANKR. R. 704(b), 
provides for service by registered or certified mail in any adversary bankruptcy 
proceeding and is patterned largely after FED. R. Clv. P. 4(d). 
3. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10-424 to -426, -430 to -432, -463. 
4. IND. R. TR. P. 4.1 (Burns 1973). Additionally, the rules provide that when-
ever a party seeking service of process fails to designate the preferred manner of 
service in the summons, the court clerk shall mail process to the defendant at the 
address indicated on the summons or at any address otherwise ascertainable. IND. R. 
TR. P. 4(d) (Burns 1973). 
5. Registered mail and certified mail differ from ordinary mail in that they 
provide for return receipts indicating successful delivery to the addressee or a person 
representing him. Certified mail differs from registered mail primarily in two 
respects: (1) certified mail provides no record of sending at the post office from 
which it is mailed, and (2) there is no indemnity for certified mail in case of loss or 
damage. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.1, 168.1 (1975). 
Both certified mail and registered mail require records of delivery to be kept at the 
post office. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.1, 168.1 (1975). Both are dispatched and handled in 
transit as ordinary mail and are taken to the addressee by postal carriers on their first 
trip after receipt unless the addressee has requested the postmaster to hold his mail 
for him at the post office. If the carrier cannot deliver the certified mail or 
registered mail personally and obtain a signature on the return receipt, he leaves a 
notice of arrival at the address, or a notice of arrival is mailed to the addressee 
through regular mail channels. 39 C.F.R. §§ 161.4(a), (d), 168.S(a), (e), (f), 
159.1 (a}(2)(ii) (1975). 
6. -see Fox, supra note 2, at 167. The statutes set forth the procedures plaintiffs 
381 
382 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:381 
the plaintiff produces a receipt that has been signed by the defendant 
and returned by postal authorities to the plaintiff. 7 This require-
ment ensures that the defendant receives actual notice of the 
proceeding. 8 However, it also operates to preclude many plaintiffs 
from bringing actions against defendants who, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, avoid service. Often the statute of limitations runs 
before a plaintiff can successfully commence his suit. 
This Note examines the operation of the return-receipt re-
quirement and concludes that, in light of the procedures available 
to a defendant to challenge service and to reopen default judgments 
entered against him, the requirement of a signed receipt is unduly 
harsh on plaintiffs. In the course of this examination, the Note 
details the means by which a defendant can avoid service by mail 
in a return-receipt jurisdiction and explains the operation of the 
various motions to challenge service of process, which, it is asserted, 
can protect the defendant as well as a return-receipt requirement. 
At the outset, it should be noted that service by mail without a 
return-receipt requirement complies with the due process clauses of 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Wuchter v. Pizzutti0 was the 
first case in which the Supreme Court applied established standards 
governing the constitutional sufficiency of notification to a statute 
authorizing service of process by mail. At issue was a New Jersey 
law providing for service on nonresident motorists by mailing the 
process to the Secretary of State-the motorist's agent by statute. 
The statute placed no duty on the Secretary of State to relay the 
process to the defendant. The Court reasoned that 
[t]he question made in the present case is whether a statute, making 
the Secretary of State the person to receive the process, must, in order 
to be valid, contain a provision making it reasonably probable that 
must follow in order to effect valid service, including the prerequisites to use of 
service by mail, the public official to be served in the state, the content of notice, the 
method of sending notice, the place where notice is to be sent, the type of proof of the 
mailing and delivery that is required, the provisions governing nondelivery, the places 
where service may be effected, the persons who may serve notice, and the circum-
stances under which default judgment is appropriate. Id. at 225-31 (Table 3). 
7. Id. at 167. Some states require a plaintiff to file a return receipt but do not 
specify that it must be signed by the defendant-addressee. This scheme does not pose 
the problems discussed in this Note. Arguably, the best scheme to date is that of the 
Bankruptcy Rules. BANKR. R. 704(c) allows the use of any form of mail with a 
signed return receipt. While BANKR. R. 704(g) specifies that a signed or refused 
return receipt may operate as proof of service, it expressly provides that failure to 
make proof of service does not affect its validity. The signed return receipt thus 
provides evidence of service, but inability to obtain the signed return receipt does not 
void service and jurisdiction. 
8. See, e.g., Kohler v. Derderian, 187 F. Supp. 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Weisfeld v. 
Superior Ct., 110 Cal. App. 2d 148, 242 P.2d 29 (1952); Roland v. Shelton, 106 Ga. 
App. 581, 127 S.E.2d 497 (1962); Tennant v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 286 
App. Div. 117, 141 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1955). 
9. 276 U.S. 13 (1928). 
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notice of the service on the Secretary will be communicated to the 
non-resident who is sued. . . . We think that a law with the effect 
of this one should make a reasonable provision for such probable 
communication.10 
The Court invalidated the statute on the ground that it guaranteed 
no "reasonable probability that if . . . complied with, the defendant 
will receive actual notice."11 
The standards announced in Wuchter were elaborated upon in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust,12 which today serves as 
the best expression of constitutional notice requirements: "An ele-
mentary and fundamental requirement of due process . . . is 
notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise 
interested parties of the pendency of the action . . . . The means 
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the 
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."13 The Court 
regarded service by mail as a permissible and reliable mode of noti-
fication and concluded that plaintiffs in the case before it should have 
used service by mail rather than service by publication.14 
The Mullane test of "reasonable probability of actual notice" 
has never been adequately explained by the courts, but it is clear 
that a defendant need not receive the process.15 A plaintiff, there-
fore, is not constitutionally required to prove actual notice, whether 
by producing a return receipt signed by the defendant or otherwise. 
The constitutionality of a method of service is instead determined 
as of the time the plaintiff completes service-that is, when he 
deposits the process in the postal system.16 The service is valid if, 
when mailed, there was a "reasonable probability of actual notice," 
notwithstanding that subsequent events may preclude the defendant 
10. 276 U.S. at 18-19. 
11. 276 U.S. at 24. 
12, 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
13. 339 U.S. at 314. 
14. 339 U.S. at 318-19. 
15. See, e.g., Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 254, 464 S.W.2d 573, 576-77 
(1971); Sommers v. Gaston, - Del.-,-, 295 A.2d 578, 580 (1972); Fernandez v. 
Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781, 785-86 (Fla. App. 1967); Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc. 
v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 421, 276 A.2d 74, 81 (1971); Mitchell v. Second Judicial 
Dist. Ct., 82 Nev. 377, 382, 418 P.2d 994, 997 (1966). 
16. See, e.g., Borgia v. Board of Review, 21 N.J. Super. 462, 91 A.2d 441 
(1952). The court in Mullane concluded that "notice must be such as is reasonably 
calculated to reach interested parties," which necessarily contemplates that the test of 
constitutionality be applied before service reaches a defendant. 339 U.S. at 318. The 
Court also stated: "We think that under such circumstances reasonable risks that 
notice might not actually reach every [defendant] are justifiable. 'Now and then an 
extraordinary case may tum up, but constitutional law like other moral contrivances 
has to take some chances, and in the great majority of instances no doubt justice will 
be done."' 339 U.S. at 319, quoting Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911). See also 
Davis v. Moseley, 230 N.C. 645, 55 S.E.2d 329 (1949); McCoy v. Bureau of 
Unemployment Comp., 81 Ohio App. 158, 77 N.E.2d 76 (1947). 
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from receiving it. Moreover, actual receipt of process strongly sug-
gests that the method of service provided the defendant with a 
"reasonable probability" of actual notice.17 Other factors bearing on 
reasonable probability include the correctness of the letter's address 
components, 18 the likelihood that the defendant will receive the 
letter at the address to which it is sent, 19 the possibility of postal mis-
17. See Massengill v. Campbell, 391 F.2d 233, 235 (5th Cir. 1969); Schaaf v. 
Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 472-73, 200 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1947). See also Heeney v. 
Miner, 421 F.2d 434 (8th Cir. 1970); Boyd v. Dunn, 215 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Ind. 
1963 ). 
Jurisdictions differ as to the effect of actual notice. Some courts hold that actual 
notice received prior to the commencement of the proceeding confers jurisdiction over 
the defendant despite statutory noncompliance if a defendant waits until after a 
default judgment is entered to contest jurisdiction. See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Buckner, 233 Ark. 564, 345 S.W.2d 924 (1961); Pierson v. Fisher, 131 Cal. 
App. 2d 208, 280 P.2d 491 (1955); Russell v. Edney, 227 N.C. 203, 41 S.E.2d 585 
(1947). The majority position, however, is to the contrary. See, e.g., Ex parte 
Smith, 258 Ala. 319, 62 S.2d 792 (1953); Jenkins v. Hill, 240 Ark. 197, 398 S.W.2d 
679 (1966). It is well-settled that a defendant may quash service of process in a 
timely special appearance to contest the validity of service for any deviation from the 
statute, whether or not he has received actual notice. See, e.g., Syracuse Trust Co. v. 
Keller, 35 Del. 304, 165 A. 327 (Super. Ct. 1932). 
Considerable uncertainty and variation exist as to what constitutes actual notice. 
Mullane required only that notice be reasonable under the circumstances, while Hess 
and Wuclzter were notably silent on this question. Elsewhere in the law, actual 
notice includes implied actual notice, consisting of facts that the party has •knowledge 
of that would lead a reasonably prudent person to make a reasonably diligent inquiry. 
See 1 M. MERRILL, NOTICE§§ 15-21 (1952); 66 C.J.S. Notice§ 2 (1950); Annot., 36 
A.L.R.2d 224 (1954); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 331 (1951). Whether the Supreme Court 
intended the definition of actual notice for due process purposes to extend this far is 
presently uncertain, although several courts have concluded that it did. See, e.g., 
Massengill v. Campbell, 391 F.2d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 1968) (court concluded that 
actual notice had been rendered by defendant's son's exclamation: "Dad, they are 
suing you in Tennessee"); Mack v. Scott, 230 Ark. 510, 323 S.W.2d 929 (1959); 
Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). Arguably, implied notice 
satisfies the Mullane test of reasonableness under the circumstances. Properly 
applied, the implied notice concept does not prejudice the defendant, since the 
standard of reasonableness depends upon the defendant's special knowledge of the 
likelihood that he is being sued, the credibility of the source from which notice comes, 
the credibility of the form and content of notice itself, and the ease or difficulty with 
which the defendant can ascertain all the essential facts. 
A final major problem concerns the source from which the actual notice must 
come. Is it necessary that notice be received from the process itself, or may it come 
from a wholly unrelated source? The Supreme Court has never made this clear, 
although Wuclzter and Mullane clearly contemplate actual notice coming from the 
service itself. Many lower court cases have either explicitly accepted a source other 
than service itself or at least not rejected service effected by notice received through 
an external source. See, e.g., Mack v. Scott, 230 Ark. 510, 323 S.W.2d 929 (1959) 
(notice by virtue of contacts with other defendant); Furst v. Boatman, 197 Ark. 1175, 
122 S.W.2d 189 (1938) (notice from conversations with other defendants properly 
served); Bunnell v. Holmes, 64 Colo. 345, 171 P. 365 (1918) (notice from attorney's 
investigation of land records); Montulli v. Sherlo Realty Co., 37 Misc. 2d 655, 234 
N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (actual notice coming from letter to defendant from 
plaintiff). 
18. See text at notes 98-107 infra. 
19. This problem arises when the address is as internally correct as the plaintiff-
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handling,20 whether the letter is sent "Addressee Only," and any 
special circumstances surrounding the defendant's ability to receive 
ail 21 m . 
Some service-by-mail statutes require only the satisfaction of 
minimum constitutional standards. Such statutes permit the use of 
ordinary mail, 22 require that the process be sent to the defendant's 
last known address obtainable by due diligence23 and that the 
address as spelled and numbered be sufficiently accurate to create 
a reasonable probability of receipt, 24 and require that the process 
contain reasonable notification of the proceedings instituted against 
the defendant.25 A defendant against whom a default judgment is 
entered can challenge service under these statutes on the ground that 
the service failed to comply substantially with the statute, 26 or that 
it failed to meet constitutional notice requirements. 27 Substantial 
compliance with these authorizing statutes generally occurs if the 
service in a given instance does not violate due process. 28 
In contrast to the above described statutes, most service-by-mail 
statutes contain at least some requirements that are not constitution-
ally mandated. For example, many statutes demand that the plain-
sender intended, but the process is not directed to the defendant's current address. See 
text at notes 89-97 infra. 
20. This factor is not usually accorded much weight. Most courts appear to agree 
with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914), that 
"[i]n view of the well-known skill of postal officials and employees in making proper 
delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think the presumption is clear and strong 
that the letters would reach [the defendant]." 234 U.S. at 398. To be distinguished 
is the situation where postal authorities handle mail properly but postal regulations 
permit a defendant to avoid successful service. See text at notes 38-74 infra. 
21. Cf. Bruce v. Paxton, 31 F.R.D. 197 (E.D. Ark. 1962). 
22. See, e.g., Jones v. Paxton, 27 F.2d 364 (D. Minn. 1928); Schilling v. Odlebak, 
117 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929). 
23. See text at notes 89-97 infra. 
24. On the constitutional nature of this requirement, see Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 397 (1914). See also Towe v. Giovinetti, 164 F. Supp. 159, 160 (W.D. 
Mo. 1958); Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261, 264 (1964); Schaaf v. 
Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). 
25. That is, the notification given the defendant must satisfy minimum constitu-
tional standards set forth for the sufficiency of process. See Tharp v. Tharp, 228 
Minn. 23, 36 N.W.2d 1 (1949). 
26. The concept of "substantial" compliance follows logically from the waiver 
provisions, since objections to technical or insubstantial defects are waived by the 
time the defendant makes a motion attacking default judgment. The concept was first 
applied to service-by-mail statutes by the Supreme Court in Grannis v. Ordean, 234 
U.S. 385, 397 (1914). 
27. The motion in federal courts is made under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Unlike 
the motion made on the ground of excusable neglect, see text at notes 108-29 infra, 
attacks on a court's jurisdiction are not subject to time limitations, are not addressed 
to the court's discretion, and are not conditioned on a demonstration of a meritorious 
defense. See FED. R. C1v. P. 60(b); 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 2862 (1973). 
28. See Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 398 (1914). 
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tiff use registered or certified mail, 29 that the letter be restricted to 
addressee only, 30 that the plaintiff send the letter to the defendant's 
actual address whether or not that address can be ascertained with 
due diligence, 31 that the plaintiff send notice to the defendant of ser-
vice on the statutory agent, 32 and that the plaintiff file a signed 
return receipt as evidence of actual delivery to the defendant. 33 As 
more fully discussed below, courts confronting service that fails to 
comply strictly with a statutory requirement that is not constitution-
ally mandated determine substantial compliance by considering legis-
lative intent, the effect of the defect in service on the perceived 
statutory purpose or policy, the likelihood of harm flowing from the 
defect, and the degree of deviation from the statutory directive. 34 
The rule of substantial compliance allows courts to distinguish 
between technical defects, which are waived if not asserted by timely 
motion or pleading, and material defects, which are not waived by 
the mere passage of time. 36 Focusing on the percise language and 
apparent intent of state statutes, courts have varied greatly in decid-
ing when, notwithstanding a particular defect, service substantially 
complies with the authorizing statute.36 
Because statutes that require a signed return receipt have been 
uniformly construed as evidencing a legislative policy that a defend-
ant must receive actual notice of the proceedings instituted against 
him, a plaintiff generally must file a signed receipt to comply sub-
stantially with such a statute; if a plaintiff fails to produce a signed 
receipt, any ensuing judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. 37 
29. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CoDE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973); R. I. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. § 31-7-7 (1969). 
30. See, e.g., IOWA CODE§ 321.501 (1966). 
31. Courts have construed statutory directives providing that service be made "to" 
the defendant as requiring that the process be mailed to defendant's "correct address." 
See, e.g., Hertz' You Drive It Yourself System, Inc. v. Castle, 317 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 
1958). 
32. See Fox, supra note 2, at 225-31 (listing statutes). 
33. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CODE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973 ). 
34. !See Wilson v. Refrigeration Transp., Inc., 28 Misc. 2d 781, 216 N.Y.S.2d 191 
(1961). 
35. See text at note 87 infra. A defendant may also waive his objection to lack of 
jurisdiction by voluntarily submitting to the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction 
over him. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(h)(1). Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5), with 
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). 
36. Compare Hardy v. Green, 277 F. Supp. 958 (D. Mass. 1967); Nelson v. 
District Ct., 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1958); Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 
23 S.E.2d 595 (1942); Schueren v. Querner Truck Lines, 22 Ill. App. 2d 183, 159 
N.E.2d 835 (1959); Duggan v. Ogden, 278 Mass. 432, 180 N.E. 301 (1932); 
Braunstein v. Phillips, 115 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1952), with Roland v. Shelton, 106 
Ga. App. 581, 127 S.E.2d 497 (1962); White v. Jayne, 313 Ky. 160, 230 S.W.2d 429 
(1950); Odley v. Wilson, 309 Ky. 507,218 S.W.2d 17 (1949); Schuett v. Powers, 288 
Minn. 542, 180 N.W.2d 253 (1970). 
37. On unforwardable mail, see Clawson v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F. 
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Usually, mail containing process is properly delivered and signed 
for by the defendant. At times, however, mail returns refused, 
unclaimed, or unforwardable and thus provides no signed returned 
receipt. In such instances, the plaintiffs attempt to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant will be frustrated, despite his diligent 
efforts to comply with the statute and his satisfaction of Mullane's 
constitutional demands. In interpreting return-receipt requirements, 
courts have dealt with refused, unclaimed, and unforwardable mail: 
In the case of refused mail, they have attempted to alleviate the 
deleterious effects on the plaintiff of such requirements; in the case 
of unclaimed or unforwardable mail, however, they have remained 
insensitive to the plaintiffs plight. 
An addressee of certified or registered mail can refuse to accept 
delivery from the postal carrier. When this occurs, the letter is 
promptly returned to the sender, marked "Refused."38 Courts and 
legislatures generally have avoided the harsh consequences of apply-
ing the return-receipt requirement to refused mail. Some states 
provide by statute that a plaintiff fully complies with a return-receipt 
requirement if the defendant refuses to accept his mail. 39 Courts 
elsewhere have achieved identical results by declaring, somewhat 
inconsonantly, that a plaintiff substantially complies with the statute 
despite the lack of a signed return receipt. 40 The lone contrary 
decision has been overruled by legislation. 41 
Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50 Hawaii 484, 443 P.2d 155 (1968); 
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1041 (1964). On unclaimed mail, see Paxson v. Crow-
son, 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745 
(Fla. App. 1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310 (1944). 
38. See 39 C.F.R. §§ 159.l(a)(2)(ii), 159.3(a)(1)(i) (1975). The rules 
governing refusal are identical for registered, certified, and ordinary mail except that 
only ordinary mail can be refused after delivery by returning the letter unopened to 
the post office. 39 C.F.R. § 154.l(a) (1975). Only the addressee may refuse to 
accept a letter. 39 C.F.R. § 159.1(a)(2)(ii) (1975). The addressee or person 
representing him may obtain the name and address of the sender and "look at 
registered mail while it is held by the postal employee, before accepting delivery and 
signing the delivery receipt." 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975). Postal regulations do 
not permit an addressee to receive his mail prior to signing the return receipt, 39 
C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975), and refusal to accept delivery results from refusal to sign 
the return recipt, 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(a) (1975). 
39. See, e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. CoDE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 
13-3-63 (1972); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 1-105 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 15.190 (1973-1974); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 
20-226 (1955). 
40. See, e.g., Boss v. Irvine, 28 F. Supp. 983 (W.D. Wash. 1939); Creadick v. 
Keller, 35 Del. 169, 160 A. 909 (Super. Ct. 1932); Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 
386, 182 S. 427 (1938); Mull v. Taylor, 68 Ga. App. 663, 23 S.E.2d 595 (1942); 
Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 
254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d 272 (1963); State ex rel. Charette v. District Ct., 107 
Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939). 
41. Dwyer v. Shalck, 232 App. Div. 780, 248 N.Y.S. 355 (1931). This case was 
decided before the enactment of N.Y. VEH. & TRAP. LAw § 253 (McKinney 1970), 
which validates service where defendant refuses to accept his mail. 
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Courts have paraded a host of reasons for finding substantial 
compliance when process is refused. Principally, they maintain both 
that a defendant's willful misconduct estops him from complaining 
of statutory noncompliance42 and that a finding of noncompliance 
would make service by mail far too easy to evade. 43 While achieving 
admirable results, both reasons suffer from theoretical inconsistency: 
the first because plaintiff has not been misled to his detriment, a 
traditional requirement of estoppel, and the second because it does 
not attempt to accommodate the competing policies. Courts that do 
strive for a measure of theoretical consistency reason that the test 
for substantial compliance is essentially a search for legislative intent 
and conclude that the return-receipt requirement was never meant 
to protect a defendant who refused his mail. 44 This reasoning is 
disingenuous, however, since it fails to account for the glaring 
omission of any expression of such intent in acts containing an 
unambiguous requirement of a signed return receipt. Perhaps the 
only sound basis for asserting jurisdiction in such circumstances lies 
in recognizing that the purpose of the statutory requirement is to 
provide a defendant with actual notice of the proceedings against 
him45 and that a defendant who refuses mail is probably well aware 
of its contents when he does so. A defendant who has refused ser-
vice by mail has acted with extreme culpability in frustrating the 
plaintiff's legitimate attempt to obtain a signed return receipt; denial 
of jurisdiction would render service by mail a meaningless gesture, 
voidable with impunity by any well-informed defendant. 
The case of unclaimed mail is somewhat different. Registered 
and certified mail that cannot be delivered to the addressee or a 
representative thereof is returned to the post office by the postal car-
rier. No subsequent delivery is attempted, but the carrier leaves a 
notice of arrival, informing the addressee that the letter awaits him 
at the post office, at the address to which the letter is sent.46 If 
the addressee does not claim the letter within five days, the post 
office issues a second notice of arrival but attempts a second delivery 
only if requested by the sender. 47 Registered and certified mail is 
42. See, e.g., Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 S. 427 (1938); State ex rel. 
Charette v. District Ct., 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750 (1939). 
43. ISee, e.g., Thomas Organ Co. v. Universal Music Co., 261 S.2d 323 (La. App. 
1972). 
44. See, e.g., Cherry v. Heffernan, 132 Fla. 386, 182 S. 427 (1938). 
45. See cases cited in note 8 supra. 
46. If mail is not customarily delivered by carrier to the address, no delivery is 
attempted at all, and a notice of arrival will be issued through regular mail channels. 
This procedure is followed when a defendant-addressee receives his mail at a post 
office box. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975). 
47. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975). Whenever feasible, a plaintiff should keep 
track of delivery by phone and request a second delivery so that the possibility of 
unclaimed mail is reduced. 
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held at the post office for ten to fifteen days, 48 and then returned 
to the sender marked "Unclaimed."49 Mail most frequently returns 
unclaimed when letters are addressed to "Addressee Only," since such 
mail may not be delivered to or claimed by other members of the 
addressee's household.50 
In most return-receipt jurisdictions, a plaintiff fails to comply 
substantially with the service-by-mail statute if the process returns 
unclaimed. 51 Three states provide to the contrary by statute, 52 but 
courts elsewhere have refused to find substantial compliance. Often, 
they have relied upon the reasoning in Paxson v. Crowson53 that 
a defendant has "no duty upon him to help the plaintiff complete 
the service, any more than there is a duty upon a resident defendant 
to go to the sheriff's office in response to a phone call for the pur-
pose of accepting personal service of a writ."54 Many courts have 
voiced the fear of Chief Justice Taft in Wuchter v. Pizzutti55 that 
the systematic assertion of jurisdiction over defendants who fail to 
claim their mail would permit a plaintiff to serve process on a 
patently false address and obtain jurisdiction when the letter returns 
unclaimed. 56 When process returns unclaimed, a plaintiff can avoid 
48. 39 C.F.R. § 159.3(b) (1975). 
49. Mail is returned marked "Unclaimed" if the addressee "fails to call for mail." 
39 C.F.R. § 159.l(a)(2)(ii)(m) (1975). Unlike the recipient of ordinary mail, the 
addressee of a certified or registered letter, once it is signed for, cannot return the 
letter to the post office unopened and have it returned marked "Unclaimed." 39 
C.F.R. § 154.l(a) (1975). Postal authorities mark a letter "Refused" only when the 
addressee "has refused to accept" his mail or to pay postage deficiencies thereon. 39 
C.F.R. § 159.1 (a)(2)(ii)(f) (1975). 
50. Mail is restricted when the sender marks it "Deliver to Addressee Only," or 
"Deliver to Addressee or Order." The latter permits delivery to addressee or a person 
authorized in writing to receive his mail. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(e) (1975). Restricted 
mail not deliverable as addressed is returned to the post office for the addressee to 
claim. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (1975). 
51. See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 
(1960); Paxson v. Crowson, 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v. 
Cotton, 123 S.2d 745 (Fla. App. 1960); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 
119 N.W.2d 272 (1963); Parker v. Bond, 330 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1959); Mollohan v. 
North Side Cheese Co., 144 W. Va. 215, 107 S.E.2d 372 (1959). See generally 
Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 1033, 1045 (1964). 
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1974) provides: "If the registered letter is 
not delivered to the defendant because it is unclaimed . . . service on the defendant 
shall be deemed complete on the date that the registered letter is returned to the 
plaintiff or Commissioner of Motor Vehicles." Similar provisions exist in S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 10-431.1 (Supp. 1974) and IND. ANN. STAT. CODE § 9-3-2-1 (Burns 1973). 
53. 47 Del. 114, 87 A.2d 881 (Super. Ct. 1952). 
54. 47 Del. at 117, 87 A.2d at 882. See also General Ins. Co. of America v. 
O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 (1960); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745 (Fla. 
App. 1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310 (1944). See 
generally Note, The Validity of Service of Process by Mail When There ls No Return 
Receipt: The Outer Limits of Due Process, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 556 (1972). 
55. 276 U.S. 13, 19 (1928). 
56. See, e.g., Parker v. Bond. 330 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1959); Weitzman v. Potlak, 
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denial of jurisdiction and possible loss of his suit only by proving that 
the defendant knew the probable contents of the letter and ref used 
to claim it from the post office. 57 The plaintiff's burden in such a 
case weighs heavy: -he cannot rely on any presumption of refusal 
and his evidentiary sources are doubtless few and hostile. 58 Courts 
have held insufficient showings that the defendant might have seen 
the letter and refused to recover it from his post office box, 00 or that 
the defendant's representative might have seen the return address 
when delivery was first attempted and informed the defendant of it 
later. 60 The plaintiff's only reliable protection is to monitor the post 
office's efforts and request a second delivery after the first fails; if 
·the second delivery fails, he can attempt to serve the defendant 
personally. 61 
It should be noted that much of the unclaimed mail problem 
could be alleviated by not requiring plaintiffs to send process by 
restricted ("Addressee Only") mail. Such mail will not reach a 
defendant whose hours of employment coincide with those of the 
post office and who therefore cannot claim the mail; nor will it reach 
a defendant who is temporarily away from home. Moreover, when 
mail is sent "Addressee Only," an evasive defendant and his family 
can leave a letter unclaimed when they otherwise might have had 
to refuse it. It is not clear that restricted mail is more likely to reach 
the addressee than regular certified or registered mail. Because a 
restricted-mail requirement increases the likelihood that a plaintiff 
will be unable to serve process on a defendant, and because a 
defendant is adequately protected, without the requirement, by 
31 Misc. 2d 52, 217 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1961). A defendant, of course, must 
have sufficient contacts with the forum state and can attack the court's jurisdiction at 
any time if he does not. See note 1 supra. Taft's criticism also ignores the fact that 
a plaintiff must use due diligence in finding the defendant's actual address and must 
use reasonable care in addressing the letter, see text at notes 89-99 infra, and the fact 
that defendant can always open a default judgment for excusable neglect, see text at 
notes 106-26 infra. 
51. See Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970); Zarcone v. Lesser, 
190 S.2d 805, 807 (Fla. App. 1966); Wolfs v. Challacome, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569 
(Iowa 1974); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 749-50, 119 N.W.2d 272, 
27f, (1963). 
58. A plaintiff will prevail in his attack only by successfully defeating an 
inference raised by an "Unclaimed" notation that defendant-addressee innocently 
failed to claim his mail. See Paxson v. Crowson, 47 Del. 114, 117, 87 A.2d 881, 882 
(Super. Ct. 1952); Lendsay v. Cotton, 123 S.2d 745, 747 (Fla. App. 1960); Emery 
Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 751, 119 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1963). He must 
show that the defendant had an opportunity to receive the letter but refused to do so. 
Wolfs v. Challacome, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569-70 (Iowa 1974). 
59. See, e.g., Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970). 
60 . ..See, e.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 144 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 
(1960) (by implication); Emery Transp. Co. v. Baker, 254 Iowa 744, 119 N.W.2d 
272 (1963) (by implication). 
61. 39 C.F.R. § 161.4(d) (197S) permits second delivery attempts only if the 
sender so requests. 
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various motions to attack judgment or service when he does not 
receive actual notice, an "Addressee Only" requirement seems both 
unfair and unnecessary. 
Finally, unforwardable mail presents distinct problems. The 
situation generally arises when the defendant has moved. Persons 
changing their mailing address must file a "Change of Address" 
order with the post office before postal authorities will forward their 
mail. 62 Registered, certified, or first class ordinary mail addressed 
to the former residence will be forwarded by postal authorities, at 
no extra expense, provided that the addressee has not expressly ex-
cluded such mail in his order and has not moved outside the United 
States, 63 and provided that the sender has not specified that his 
letters not be forwarded. 64 A forwarding order expires one year 
after filing if the addressee has not specified a shorter time. 65 Mail 
that for any reason cannot be forwarded is returned to the sender 
marked "Moved, left no address" or "Not deliverable as addressed-
Unable to forward." 66 
The lack of a signed return receipt resulting from unforwardable 
mail voids jurisdiction in nearly all return-receipt states. 67 Only one 
reported decision has upheld jurisdiction on the ground that service 
substantially complies with the statute despite the lack of a signed 
return receipt, 68 and only North Carolina provides by statute that ser-
62. 39 C.F.R. § 158.l(a)(l) (1975). 
63. 39 C.F.R. §§ 158.l(b)(l), (7) (1975). 
64. Mail must be marked "Do Not Forward." 39 C.F.R. §§ 158.1 (a)(2)(v) 
(ordinary mail), (b)(l) (registered and certified mail) (1975). 
65. 39 C.F.R. § 158.2 (1975). 
66. 39 C.F.R. §§ 159.112(b)(l), (12) (1975). The first notation means that 
the addressee has moved without a change of address order; the second indicates that 
an order has been filed but mail is not forwardable for some other reason. An 
addressee's failure to provide a change of address order does not automatically require 
mail to be returned. Directory assistance, where available, may permit the letter to 
be forwarded if the addressee has not moved out of the delivery zone of his post 
office. 39 C.F.R. § 159.5 (1975). 
67. See, e.g., Yox v. Durgan, 298 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Clawson v. 
Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50 
Hawaii 484,443 P.2d 155 (1963); Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151 N.W.2d 
562 (1967); Bauman v. Fisher, 12 App. Div. 2d 32, 208 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1960); 
Bernardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
68. In Fernandez v. Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1967), the court 
permitted service on the Secretary of State, whose mailing to the defendant's last 
known address was returned marked "Refused." The court stated: 
With a society as mobile as ours, when a non-resident motor vehicle owner or 
operator, or a resident owner or operator who subsequently becomes a non-
resident or conceals his whereabouts, accepts the privilege of the public high-
ways of the state and is involved in an accident, he has a duty not to conceal his 
whereabouts and to let his whereabouts be known so that anyone involved in 
such accident . . . may come into court and seek redress. If such an owner or 
operator conceals his whereabouts and makes it impossible for an aggrieved 
party to serve him with notice by registered mail as provided by the statute and 
· such aggrieved party shows that he has used due diligence in endeavoring to 
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vice is complete when a defendant removes himself from his last 
known address and leaves no forwarding address. 00 Other return-
receipt states refuse to impose upon the defendant-addressee a duty 
to file a forwarding order with the post office-a conclusion consist-
ent with the rule in these states that a defendant has no duty to claim 
his mail.70 
A plaintiff can successfully defend against a defendant's juris-
dictional attack when process is unforwardable only by proving that 
the defendant intentionally provided the court, plaintiff, or investi-
gating body with a false address, 71 or by showing that the defendant 
willfully caused the plaintiff to delay mailing process in order to 
move without a forwarding address. 72 When a defendant moves and 
negligently leaves no forwarding order, the plaintiffs only hope is 
that his state permits service by publication on a defendant conceal-
ing his whereabouts. But even then, plaintiff may find re-service 
barred by the statute of limitations or frustrated by stringent court 
rules on proving concealment. 73 The plaintiffs plight in return-
receipt states has been aptly summarized by New York's highest 
court: "The argument is made that [failure to vest jurisdiction] 
makes it possible for a nonresident defendant to thwart service by 
registered mail . . . by simply moving and leaving no forwarding 
address. This is so."74 
make service . . . the failure to file defendant's return receipt does not prevent 
the court from acquiring jurisdiction. 
201 S.2d at 785-86. 
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-105 (Supp. 1974). The constitutionality of an earlier, 
similar provision was upheld in Denton v. Ellis, 258 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.N.C. 1966). 
70. See note 54 supra. If a defendant has no duty to claim a letter even if he is 
aware that it awaits him at the post office, he presumably also has no duty to go to 
the same post office to file a forwarding order to accommodate service of process by 
mail even before it is sent. 
71. See Greenwood v. White, 25 App. Div. 2d 73, 226 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (1966); 
Cohen v. Arista Truck Renting Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 729, 335 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Sup. Ct. 
1972). See also Comment, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 253: Actual Notice Nol 
Necessary Where Defendant Gave False Address, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1966), 
But see Drinkard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 290 S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1956). 
72. See Kenworthy v. Van Zandt, 71 Misc. 2d 950, 337 N.Y.S.2d 481 (New York 
City Ct. 1972). 
73. Service by publication, authorized by court rule or state statute, is constitu-
tional under the test of Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928), when a plaintiff 
cannot, by exercising due diligence, discover the defendant's whereabouts. Most 
statutes and rules require the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the defendant cannot 
be found or is concealing his whereabouts. See N.Y. C1v. PRAC. LAW § 308(5) 
(McKinney 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 15.190(7) (1974); S.C. CooE ANN. § 10-
451(2) (1962); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN,§ 15-9-7 (1967). Since service by publica-
tion is in derogation of common-law rules and is of qualified constitutionality, the 
statute or rule authorizing it must be strictly followed. See Harrison v. Hanvey, 265 
N.C. 243, 143 S.E.2d 593 (1965). 
74. Bemardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 184, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1022 
(Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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There are thus situations where a plaintiff faced with a return-
receipt requirement will be unable, through no fault of his own, to 
serve process properly by mail. Were there a Handbook for Avoid-
ing Service, one chapter would graphically illustrate the ease with 
which a cunning defendant can exploit the situation: 
I. SERVICE BY MAIL 
A. States Requiring a Signed Return Receipt 
If you are a defendant in these states, you should count your 
blessings and your money: service by mail requiring a signed return 
receipt for jurisdiction is one of the easiest sorts to avoid. Depending 
on your situation and the mode of attempted service, one of the fol-
lowing alternative courses of action should enable you to avoid ever 
litigating on the merits. 
1. A voiding Service 
a. Open a post office box and discontinue home delivery. By dis-
continuing home delivery you eliminate any chance of successful de-
livery by a postal carrier. Postal authorities will simply leave a 
notice to claim in your box, which you will ignore with impunity.75 
Beware: although no defendant-addressee has a duty to claim 
his mail, a court willing to distinguish prior case law may find a 
refusal to accept service from the -bare fact that you failed to re-
cover the notice from your box. Your best bet is to recover the 
notice from your box after postal hours and argue that you forgot to 
recover the letter thereafter. This should satisfactorily counter the 
plaintiff's contention that you refused to claim the letter. 76 
75. The rule followed in every jurisdiction that has faced the issue is that there is 
no duty to claim mail. See note 54 supra. The advantage of a post office box is that 
delivery is never made in person. The postal employees will leave a notice to claim 
and rely on the defendant's active cooperation to complete delivery. 39 C.F.R. § 
161.4(d) (1975). If delivery were attempted personally, you would have to accept or 
refuse, either of which vests a court with jurisdiction. 
76. There is a presumption that any failure to claim mail is inadvertent rather 
than an intentional refusal. See, e.g., Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 
310 (1944). One delightful case you should always cite is Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. 
Supp. 201 (D.C.Z. 1970). There, process was forwarded to the defendant and a 
notice to claim was left in her husband's post office box. The notice sat there 
untouched until the process-bearing letter was returned to sender mar•ked "Un-
claimed." Evidence was adduced that all other mail delivered to the post office box 
was properly received, raising a strong inference that the defendant ignored the notice 
to claim. The court agonized over the defendant's clear refusal of service and 
declared: "A proper showing that a letter lies unclaimed after numerous notices such 
as occurred in this case is probably tantamount to a refusal." 319 F. Supp. at 204. 
But such an inference could not rebut the presumption that unclaimed mail does not 
show a refusal to accept delivery: "But such evidence [of refusal] should be pre-
sented in a deposition or oral testimony . . . . The record shows only that the no-
tices were not picked up and the letter was unclaimed, but nothing else appears to 
substantiate a concealment." 319 F. Supp. at 204. If you are so foolish as to recover 
other mail from the same box which contains the notice to claim, at least be sure 
not to provide the plaintiff with any direct evidence of a refusal to claim. 
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b. If your state requires that process be sent "Addressee Only," 
refuse to answer the door during hours of postal delivery. Arrange 
for another member of your household to greet the postal carrier. 
Since he cannot deliver the letter to anyone but you, he will leave 
a notice to claim, which you, of course, will disregard with impunity. 77 
Use this method if served at your place of work as well. Don't be 
caught offguard after one successful evasion: an alert plaintiff will 
have the post office attempt a second delivery. Also, anticipate and 
attempt to thwart all possible arguments that you refused to accept 
service. For example, direct the person who greets the postal carrier 
to tell him you are indisposed rather than absent, lest the plaintiff 
disprove your alleged absence and thereby discredit your scheme. 
Remember, whether or not you refused ,to claim the letter is a jury 
question once the plaintiff adduces a deposition or oral testimony to 
that end.'18 Since juries may well ·be unsympathetic to your evasive 
tactics, avoid sending the issue to a jury. 
c. If your state does not require "Addressee Only" delivery, 
permit no one to answer the door when the postal carrier attempts 
delivery. Disregard the notice to claim that will be left in your mail-
box. The plaintiff might show that you refused to answer the door 
for delivery, but this should not validate service as would a showing 
of refusal to accept delivery, since you presumably were unaware of 
any attempt to serve process by mail. 79 You and all members of your 
household must be vigilant. This method does not work if you are 
served at your place of employment. 
d. Take a vacation. Not only will the carrier be unable to deliver 
mail to you, but there is no hope for the plaintiff to prove refusal 
to claim since you did not know you had mail at all. This method 
guarantees a high degree of protection from re-service, since mail will 
return "Unclaimed" and plaintiff will probably not attempt a second 
mailing. Unless you are certain of service at a particular time, how-
ever, a long vacation may be necessary to ensure nondelivery. 
e. Move to a new residence without filing a change of address 
or forwarding order with the post office. For added protection, 
change your place of employment. Unless you are careless, service 
by mail will fail. 80 The plaintiff may re-serve you by publication if 
11. See notes 50, 75 supra. 
78. Heinert v. Johnson, 319 F. Supp. 201, 204 (D.C.Z. 1970). The plaintiff will 
also argue that a refusal to receive delivery when the opportunity was available vests 
the court with jurisdiction. See Wolfs v. Challacombe, 218 N.W.2d 564, 569 (Iowa 
1974); Creadick v. Keller, 35 Del. 169, 171, 160 A. 909 (1932). 
19. See General Ins. Co. of America v. O'Day, 114 Colo. 376, 356 P.2d 888 
(1960); Stone v. Sinkfield, 70 Ga. App. 787, 29 S.E.2d 310,311 (1944). 
80. Most courts have held the lack of a signed return receipt fatal to successful 
jurisdiction when mail returns unforwardable. See, e.g., Yox v. Durgan, 298 F. Supp. 
1365 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Clawson v. Central Neb. Packing Co., 219 F. Supp. 1 
(N.D. Ind. 1963); Manley v. Nelson, 50 Hawaii 484, 443 P.2d 155 (1968); Matney 
v. Currier, 203 N.W.2d 589 (Iowa 1973); Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151 
N.W.2d 562 (1967); Bauman v. Fisher, 12 App. Div. 2d 32, 208 N.Y.S.2d 317 
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your state permits, b_cit most states permit such alternative service 
only when the plaintiff c_i,i:n show that you were concealing your 
whereabouts.81 Your ,best 's_trategy is to disguise your intent to evade 
service by leaving sufficient but obscure means for the plaintiff to find 
your new address. The efticacy of this technique entirely depends 
on the stringency of service by publication statutes, the plaintiff's dili-
gence in effecting a second se~icy, and the artfulness with which you 
disguise your intent to conceal. It is a demanding but effective ploy. 
2. Avoiding Trial on the Merits 
In most instances, you will be free from liability if you evade ser-
vice of process until the statute of limitations runs on the plaintiff's 
claim. A court migp.t fail tq .notice the defect in service, _however, 
and enter a default judgment . again~t you. If so, two courses are 
available for avoiding trial on the merits. 
a. Wait until the .statute of limitations runs on the plaintiff's 
cause of action and then file a motion to vacate the default judgment 
for lack of jurisdiction. This motion may be made at any time, and 
since it does not involve the exercJse of any judicial discretion, your 
delay will not prejudice its success. The only problem is that a 
motion to open judgment for trial on grounds of excusable neglect 
invariably must be made within, a specified time after entry of de-
fault. If you lose your jurisdict~onal attack, therefore, your delay 
may cause the judgment to stand.~2 . It is a risk worth taking if you 
are on solid ground with the jurisdictional attack. 
b. Have another party set aside judgment for you. This is the 
best alternative when the plaintiff cannot locate. you and another 
defendant or party in interest can represent you. · The other party 
can bring the jurisdictional attack prior to the expiration of the statute 
of limitations on the plaintiff's claim and prior to expiration of the 
time to reopen judgment for excusable neglect. The plaintiff, if he 
(1960); Bemardt v. Scianimanico, 21 Misc. 2d 182, 192 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 
1959). . 
81. The plaiFtiff must prove willful concealment by direct evidence; the fact that 
your address is ~kown or unascertainable does not raise a presumption or permissible 
inference that you are concealing yours.elf. See Harrison· v. Hanvey, 265 N.C. 243, 
254-55, 143 S.E.2d 593, 601-02 (1965); Dow v. Bolden, 245 S.C. 321, 140 S.E.2d 473 
(1965). Statutes permitting service by publication when the plaintiff cannot with due 
diligence discover- your address have been held to require the plaintiff to exhaust all 
"reasonable means'.' to find you. See Staie ex rel. Pratt v. Main, 253 Ore. 408, 413, 
454 P.2d 643, 64f(1969). 
82. See Ramitez v. Rackley, 45 Del. 161, 167-68, 70 A.2d 1-8, 21-22 (Super. Ct. 
1949), in which the· defendant received what he believed to be improperly served 
notice and waited· 16 months to move to set aside default judgment for lack of 
jurisdiction. The court let the judgment stand against the defendant's jurisdictional 
attack and refused to award relief on excusable neglect grounds: 
[N]o good reason:.is given why Defendant should now, rather than two years 
ago, elect to come:• into this Court, yet it is significant that [the facts defendant 
asserts give him a 'defense on the merits] were not adduced until after, rather 
than before, the statute ran on Plaintiffs claim with the result that if Defendant 
were successful in .urging his legal defenses ... Plaintiff [~ould] be deprived 
of the right of a tri~l on the merits. · 
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loses, still will not know where to effect service on you. If your juris-
dictional attack fails, the party representing you may move to open 
the judgment for excusable neglect. 83 
Levity aside, a return-receipt requirement. does effectuate the 
legitimate legislative goal of providing defendants with actual notice 
of actions brought against them. 84 However, it also reflects a legis-
lative determination that may not be legitimate-namely, that the 
burden on a plaintiff to re-serve a defendant within the period of 
the statute of limitations is an acceptable cost of achieving that goal. 
As discussed below, the various motions available to a defendant to 
dismiss a default judgment and the various additional requirements 
for proper service together are sufficient to protect defendants 
against plaintiffs acting in bad faith; what little extra protection a 
return-receipt requirement adds is clearly outweighed by the burden 
imposed on plaintiffs. 
Ordinarily a defendant can attack defects in service of process 
before entry of judgment by a motion to dismiss or other plea in 
abatement, 85 or by a motion to quash service. 86 Either motion will 
succeed if the plaintiff has failed to comply precisely with statutory 
requirements, although objections to technical defects are waived if 
the motions are not timely made.87 Clearly, these pre-judgment 
motions can be made only when a defendant has actual notice of 
the action commenced against him. As long as t-he plaintiff does 
not bring his action immediately prior to the expiration of the statute 
of limitations, he will have adequate time in which to re-serve the 
defendant properly if he loses a pre-judgment motion. Trial on the 
merits is most frequently jeopardized by the statute of limitations 
when the defendant lacks or ignores actual notice of the proceedings 
until a default judgment is entered against him. It is in the default 
context, therefore, that the merits and demerits of the return-receipt 
requirement are most sharply apparent. 
In a jurisdiction that does not require a signed return-receipt 
(and hence does not require that defendants have actual notice), 
a defendant acting in good faith is still adequately protected against 
the possibility that a default judgment against him will be executed. 
He can attack a default judgment either on the ground that, because 
83. See Dimmitt v. Campbell, 260 Iowa 884, 151 N.W.2d 562 (1967). 
84. See note 8 supra. 
85. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(5). 
86. A motion to quash generally results in the invalidation of service and the 
plaintiff need only re-serve the defendant. A motion to dismiss or a plea in 
abatement, on the other hand, results in the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action. 
The plaintiff must re-commence the action entirely, if not barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
81. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(l). 
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service failed to comply substantially with the authorizing statute or 
failed to meet constitutional notice requirements, the judgment is 
void for lack of jurisdiction, or on the ground that, because of excus-
able neglect, mistake, inadvertence, or the like, he defaulted. 88 
For a plaintiff serving process by mail to comport with due 
process and to comply substantially with the statute authorizing ser-
vice by mail, he must, in general, use due diligence to discover the 
defendant's actual address, 89 and must address the letter in a manner 
that creates at least a reasonable probability that it will reach that 
address. With regard to the former requirement, most statutes 
specify that process be mailed to the defendant's "last known" 
address, 00 although a few courts have erroneously concluded from 
Mullane that process must be mailed to the defendant's actual 
address. 01 This due diligence requirement demands much of the 
plaintiff, for, while he need not in most jurisdictions exhaust all con-
ceivable means to find the defendant's actual address, he must 
employ all reasonable means. 02 Such reasonable means include, but 
are not limited to, inquiry of the post office, of public utility com-
panies, of the defendant's last known employer, and of neighbors, 
relatives, and friends in the area of the defendant's last known 
address. 03 Plaintiff must prove his due diligence by affidavit or 
other "positive statement of probative or evidentiary facts" that show 
when such inquiries were made, and his inquiries must have been 
recent enough for reasonable reliance thereon. 94 Whenever a plain-
tiff has more than one address at which to serve the defendant, he 
will not comply with the "last known" address provision if the 
defendant can show that service was more likely to have been made 
at an address not used. 95 'f.he stringency of the requirement was 
noted by a court as early as 1931: 
88. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l). 
89. See Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971); Shanklin v. 
Bender, 283 A.2d 651 (D.C. App. 1971); Drinkard v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 290 
S.W.2d 175 (Mo. App. 1956); Central Natl. Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Garrison, 114 Ohio 
App. 162, 180 N.E.2d 621 (1961); Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash. 2d 36, 360 
P.2d 744 (1961). 
90. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 321.501 (1966); MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 170.54 (1960). 
Many courts have held that a "last known address" provision complies with the 
minimum constitutional standards. See Towe v. Giovinetti, 164 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. 
Mo. 1958); Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 473 (1971); Fernandez v. 
Chamberlain, 201 S.2d 781 (Fla. App. 1967); Esterdahl v. Wilson, 252 Iowa 1199, 
110 N.W.2d 241 (1961); Volmer v. Hoel, 87 Ohio App. 199, 93 N.E.2d 416 (1950); 
Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478, 487 P.2d 660 (1971). 
91. See, e.g., Hertz' You Drive It Yourself, Inc. v. Castle, 317 S.W.2d 177 (Ky. 
1958). 
92. See Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 A. 255 (1931); Ter Harv. Backus, 
259 Ore. 478,487 P.2d 660 (1971). 
93. See Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478,482,487 P.2d 660, 662 (1971). 
94. Ter Harv. Backus, 259 Ore. 478, 482-83, 487 P.2d 660, 662 (1971). 
95. See Crete v. Audet, 353 Mass. 725, 234 N.E.2d 733 (1968); Skinner v. 
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[The "last known" address provision] does not mean the last 
address known to the plaintiff but does mean the last address of 
the defendant so far as it is known, that is, by those who under the 
ordinary circumstances of life would know it. Unless the defendant 
has departed for parts unknown it means his actual address; if he 
has disappeared, it means his last address so far as it is reasonably 
possible to ascertain it. This address the plaintiff must learn at his 
peril and only if the copy is mailed to it is there a compliance with 
the statute. 96 
A defendant who can show that the plaintiff did or should have ascer-
tained his actual address can set aside default judgment in a 
nonretum-receipt state as void for lack of jurisdiction.07 
To address the process-bearing letter properly, a plaintiff need 
only provide the defendant with a reasonable probability of re-
ceipt. No statute requires that the defendant's name be cor-
rectly spelled and the street and city address correctly numbered 
and spelled. Courts generally consider a number of factors in 
determining substantial statutory compliance, 98 including whether 
an error in the defendant's name is in his first, middle, or last 
name, 99 whether the name as pronounced properly resembles the 
pronounced name as spelled on the letter, 100 whether the name 
Mueller, 1 Wis. 2d 328, 335-36, 84 N.W.2d 71, 75 (1957) (indicating that the test 
whether one address was more likely to be where defendant would receive his mail is 
a test of foresight, determined at the time of mailing). 
96. Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 80, 154 A. 255,258 (1931). 
91. See Conner v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 313, 96 N.E.2d 13 (1950); Central Natl. 
Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Garrison, 114 Ohio App. 162, 180 N.E.2d 621 (1961). It 
should also be noted that whenever a plaintiff gives a defendant notice of the default 
(for example, by executing judgment), the defendant has a powerful argument that 
the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence to locate him earlier when service was 
attempted. 
98. Most cases involving misnomers in the process itself arise when the plaintiff 
moves to amend on his own initiative upon discovering the error before default 
occurs, or when the defendant moves to quash service or dismiss the action for faulty 
service. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. Fed. 285 (1972). 
99. The tests of idem sonans and similarity of written words should not be used as 
the ultimate standard of compliance, but rather should be used as factors to consider 
in assessing the reasonable probability that the letter as addressed would reach the 
defendant: This is made clear in Grannis, where the Court said: "[WJe need not 
confine ourselves to the test of idem so11a11s, nor to the appearance of the name in 
print, but may employ both of these, with such additional tests as may be available in 
view of what is disclosed by the record." 234 U.S. at 397. Generally, however, a 
misnomer satisfying the idem sonans or similarity of written words tests will also 
satisfy the Grannis test of "reasonable probability" or actual notice. But a misnomer 
failing the idem so11a11s or similarity of written words tests will not necessarily fail the 
Grannis constitutional standard. 
Similarly, while the location of the misspelling in the name is obviously a factor 
of considerable importance, the fiction that middle initials are no part of a name 
should be abandoned. While an error in the middle initial will be insignificant in 
most cases, the rule should not apply in the rare case where such error is substantial. 
To hold as a rigid rule that service is always valid in such cases ignores the Grannis 
holding. 
100. In Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964), the court held that 
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as actually spelled resembles the correctly spelled name alphabeti-
cally, 101 whether the defendant actually received the letter as 
addressed, 102 the size of the city to which the letter was sent, 103 and 
whether the defendant who received the misaddressed letter refused 
it in good faith, thinking it was meant for another.104 A few courts, 
however, have adopted firm rules-notably, that a mistaken middle 
initial can never be substantial noncompliance.105 Interpreting a 
statute requiring only the minimum constitutional standards, the 
Supreme Court in Grannis v. Ordean106 concluded that, while the 
foregoing tests were helpful, the ultimate standard for testing stat-
utory compliance was "whether, when [the letter] reached the post 
office [it] would, in reasonable probability, be delivered to [the de-
fendant] ."107 
Even if a plaintiff has complied with the requirements of due 
diligence in finding the defendant's address and has taken reason-
able care in addressing the letter, the defendant still has an oppor-
tunity to set aside a default judgment on the ground of excusable 
neglect.108 Unlike the motion to dismiss for failure to comply sub-
"Edwin" sounded sufficiently similar to "Edward" that the defendant had actual 
notice of the action and service substantially complied with the statute. 
The theory behind the doctrine of idem sonans is that the purpose of a name is 
merely a means of identifying the particular person. Such purpose is achieved when 
the name as written incorrectly is pronounced similarly to the correctly spelled name. 
In light of the many variations in spelling possible to achieve similar sounds, the 
application of the idem sonans doctrine is extremely flexible. See 57 AM. JUR. 2d 
Name§§ 17-21 (1971). 
101. See Spence v. Commercial Motor Freight, 99 Ohio App. 14~, 127 N.E.2d 
427 (1954). 
102. See Scharf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). See also United 
States v. Brandt, 8 F.R.D. 163 (D. Mont. 1948); Sacco v. Frilund, 32 Misc. 2d 834, 
222 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1961); In re Edwards Trust, 142 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 
1955). 
103. Compare Gluszek v. Richardson, 352 F. Supp. 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(process addressed to "Anastasia Gluszek, Chester, Pennsylvania" held invalid for 
statutory noncompliance for omission of street name and number in letter sent to city 
of 60,000 people), with Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 S. 483 (1933) (service 
by mail lacking street name and number upheld when sent to and received in Carson 
City, Nevada, a town of 2,000 people). 
104. See Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959); 
Kraft v. Bahr, 256 Iowa 822, 128 N.W.2d 261 (1964); Schaaf v. Brown, 304 Ky. 466, 
200 S.W.2d 909 (1947). 
105. See Clark v. National Adjusters, Inc., 140 Colo. 593, 348 P.2d 370 (1959); 
Nelson v. District Ct., 136 Colo. 467, 320 P.2d 959 (1957). 
106. 234 U.S. 385 (1914). 
107. 234 U.S. at 396-97. The Supreme Court in Grannis confronted the issue 
whether there had been compliance with the statutory requirement that plaintiff mail 
process "to" the defendant when the plaintiff-sender misspelled the defendant's name 
on the address. The Court apparently accepted the state court's determination that 
such a statutory provision required compliance with constitutional due process stan-
dards, since the statute's constitutionality was neither challenged nor discussed. 
108. Twenty-eight states have provisions identical to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l), 
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stantially with the service-by-mail statute, the excusable neglect 
motion reopens the judgment for a trial on the merits. Because this 
result is less desirable to the defendant, he will employ a motion for 
excusable neglect only if the plaintiff has substantially complied with 
the statute. The excusable neglect motion is available only if the 
defendant has an adequate excuse for failing to plead or otherwise 
which permits the opening of a default judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect." ALA. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); ALAS. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); ARIZ. 
R. CIV. P. 60(c)(l); COLO. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); DEL. SUPER. CT. (av.) R. 60(b) 
(1); FLA. R. C1v. P. 1.540(b)(l); HAWAII R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); IDAHO R. CIV, P. 
60(b)(l); IND. R. TR. P. 60(b)(l); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-260(b)(l) (1964); KY. 
R. CIV. P. 60.02(1); ME. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); MASS. av. R. 60(b)(l); MINN. DIST. 
CT. R. 60.02(1); MONT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); NEV. R. C1v. P. 60(b){l); N.J. av. 
PRAc. R. 4:50-l(a); N.M. R. CIV. P. 60(b){l); N.C. R. av. P. 60(b)(l); N.D. R. 
CIV. P. 60(b)(l); Omo R. CIV. P. 60(B)(l); R.I. R. C1v. P. 60(b)(l); S.D. COMP, 
LAWS ANN. § 15-6-60(b)(l) (1967); TENN. R. av. P. 60.02(1); UTAH R. CIV. P. 
60(b)(l); VT. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); WASH. SUPER. CT. (CIV.) R. 60(b)(l); W. VA. 
R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); Wis. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(l); WYO. R. av. P. 60(b)(l). 
Four other states have adopted generally the federal standards of "mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" although not in identical form. CAL. 
av. PRAc. CODE§ 473 (West Supp. 1975); IowA R. CIV. P. 236; ORE. REV. STAT. § 
18.160 (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 10-1213 (1962). 
Eleven states have statutes or rules that operate the same as FED, R. CIV. P. 
60(b)(l) using analogous standards . .ARK. STAT. ANN,§ 29-401 (1962) ("nothing in 
this Act shall impair the discretion of the Court to set aside any default judgment 
upon showing of excusable neglect, unavoidable casualty or other just cause"); CONN, 
GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 52-212 (Supp. 1975) ("mistake, accident, or other reasonable 
cause"); GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-160(e) (1967) ("fraud, accident or mistake"); ILL, 
REv. SrAT. ch. 110, § 50(5) (1968) (court may set aside judgment "in its discretion", 
interpreted to include excusable neglect, Schmidt v. Stiller, 9 Ill. App. 2d 415, 132 
N.E.2d 687 (1956) ); MD. DIST. CT. R. 625 (giving the court discretion only for 
fraud, mistake, or irregularity); MICH. GEN. Cr. R. 520.4 ("for good cause shown," 
interpreted to include excusable neglect, Albro Leasing, Inc. v. Sylvester, 40 Mich. 
App. 227, 198 N.W.2d 437 (1972)); Mo. REv. STAT. § 511.120 (1952) ("for good 
cause shown," interpreted as requiring reasonable diligence or excuse to set judgment 
aside, Whitledge v. Anderson Air Activities, Inc., 276 S.W.2d 114 (Mo. 1955) ); NEB, 
REv. SrAT. § 25-2001(7) (1964) (for "unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing 
the party from prosecuting or defending"); N.Y.R. Crv. PRAc. 5015(a)(l) ("excusa• 
ble default"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1031(7) ("for unavoidable casualty or misfor-
tune"); Tux. R. CIV. P. 320 ("for good cause," interpreted to permit setting judgment 
aside whenever not the result of movant's gross neglect or intentional misconduct, 
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Burton, 272 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. App. 1954)). 
Five remaining states have either vague statutes or no provisions at all for setting 
aside a default judgment. Courts in these states have devised the motion judicially. In 
Mississippi a defendant may set aside judgment "if justice demands that the default 
, judgment be set aside and a trial had on the merits." Ponder v. O'Neal Electric Co., 
214 S.2d 453, 455 (Miss. 1968). LA. CODE C1v. P. art. 2004 (1961), allows 
judgment to be set aside for "fraud or ill practices," which has been construed to 
allow relief wherever default would be "unconscientious and inequitable." Bell v. 
Holdcraft, 196 S. 379 (La. App. 1940). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514:2 (1955) 
allows judgment to be set aside "at the discretion of the court," but courts have not 
bad occasion to interpret the statute. See Lewellyn v. Follansbee, 94 N.H. 111, 47 
A.2d 572 (1946). Pennsylvania's common-law rule requires defendants seeking to set 
aside default judgments to demonstrate: (1) an excusable reason for the default, (2) 
a meritorious defense, (3) raised by timely motion. Stott v. Triad Distributors, Inc., 
327 A.2d 151 (Pa. Super. 1974). Virginia's common-law rule is harsher than the 
federal rule, and permits defendant to set aside judgment only when he has acted 
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defend109 and has a meritorious defense to the plaintiffs claim.110 
The motion is directed to the court's sound legal discretion, and, 
unlike a motion to set aside judgment for lack of jurisdiction, it is 
never granted as a matter of right.111 The defendant usually must 
make his motion within a specified time after entry of default, 112 
although, if the plaintiff delays executing judgment to avoid giving 
the defendant notice of the default, courts can and should disregard 
the time limits.113 
without negligence. Powell v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Lynchburg, Inc., 213 Va. 647, 
194 S.E.2d 742 (1973). 
109. Because the defendant concedes that the court has jurisdiction over him, the 
case is not thrown out entirely and the plaintiff need not recommence his action by 
reserving the defendant. Statutes or court rules authorizing the motion may express 
the excusable reason as "excusable neglect," "inadvertence," "surprise," "mistake," 
"unavoidable casualty," and the like. See notes 114-25 infra and accompanying text. 
110. Although there may be minor differences among jurisdictions, the merito-
rious defense requirement generally can be easily satisfied. The requirement aims at 
denying vacation of default judgment only where the defendant's lack of defense 
would make trial on the merits a useless gesture. To satisfy the court that his defense 
is "meritorious," the defendant need only state the facts and legal theory upon which 
his case relies. See Lamoreaux v. Havranek, 25 Ill. App. 2d 51, 53, 165 N.E.2d 547, 
549 (1960). See also Robinson v. Bantam Books, 49 F.R.D. 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 
Simmons v. Flotz, 530 P.2d 999, 1000 (Colo. App. 1974); Hotel Last Frontier Corp. 
v. Frontier Properties, Inc., 79 Nev. 150, 380 P.2d 293 (1963). The defendant need 
not prove or substantiate his case to the court in order to present a meritorious 
defense. See Evry v. Tremble, 154 Cal. App. 2d. 444, 448, 316 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); 
Ehrlinger v. Parker, 137 Colo. 514, 327 P.2d 267 (1958); Medford Red Cab, Inc. v. 
Duncan, 341 Mass. 708, 709-10, 172 N.E.2d 260, 261 (1961); National Surety Corp. 
v. Shoemaker, 86 S.D. 302, 310, 195 N.W.2d 134, 138 (1972). 
111. See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970); TholJ)e v. Thorpe, 
364 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Teal v. King Farms Co., 18 F.R.D. 447 (E.D. Pa. 
1955); Riskin v. Towers, 24 Cal. 2d 274, 148 P.2d 611 (1944). 
112. The time period under the federal rules is one year. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
A handful of states have no fixed time limit and permit any excusable neglect motion 
that is made with due diligence after receipt of actual notice of the entry of default 
judgment. See, e.g., Foster v. Nixon, 194 Pa. Super. 572, 168 A.2d 630 (1961) 
(!aches alone bars the motion); Broome v. Broome, 230 S.C. 155, 94 S.E.2d 439 
(1956) (delay of three years held not without due diligence where defendant lacked 
actual notice before that time); Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d 
445 (Tex. App. 1960) (defendant need only show that delay in moving to vacate 
judgment for excusable neglect will not injure plaintiff). 
113. A few jurisdictions have held that there must be strict complaince with the 
time limits imposed by court rule or statute regardless of any excuses for an untimely 
motion. Most such jurisdictions have not confronted the situation where the plaintiff 
delays execution of judgment to perpetuate the defendant's ignorance of default. 
See, e.g., Waxler v. Levin, 131 A.2d 294 (D.C. App. 1957). In jurisdictions 
dispensing with strict time limits when the plaintiff engages in fraud, a defendant 
victimized by lack of notice of default judgment may argue that the plaintiffs delay in 
executing judgment permits an otherwise untimely motion and works an injustice. See 
Smith v. Jackson Tool & Die, Inc., 426 F.2d 5, 8 (5th Cir. 1970); Byron v. Bleakley 
Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413, 415-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Some courts permit defend-
ants to assert untimely motions by simply ignoring the time requirement where the 
defendants' delay is caused by their innocent lack of notice of the entry of default 
judgment. See, e.g., Martinez v. Valdez, 9 Ill. App. 3d 895, 293 N.E.2d 443 (1973); 
Levine v. Berlin, 46 App. Div. 2d 902, 362 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188-89 (1974). 
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One adequate excuse for defaulting is lack of actual notice of 
proceedings, and this excuse is available whether mail returns 
unclaimed114 or unforwardable, 115 when postal mishandling or incor-
rectly spelled or numbered address causes nonreceipt, 116 or when a 
forwarding agent malperf orms.11 7 A defendant generally will lose 
his motion if he has intentionally concealed his whereabouts or given 
the plaintiff a faulty address at which to mail the process. 118 A 
defendant who disregarded actual notice of the proceedings will be 
deemed to have acted inexcusably, although he may prevail by 
presenting an adequate excuse for his actions.110 If the process-
bearing letter returns "Refused," the defendant can set aside the 
judgment only by demonstrating an acceptable reason for the refus-
al: for example, that a third party refused delivery without his 
knowledge, 120 or that postal authorities improperly marked the letter 
"Refused."121 If the default is caused by a third party entrusted by 
the defendant to receive notice, courts will open the judgment unless 
the defendant's appointment of the third party was unreasonable and 
unnecessary.122 In determining the adequacy of the excuse in these 
114. See Koukal v. Coy, 219 Ore. 414, 347 P.2d 602 (1959). 
115. See Byron v. Bleakley Transp. Co., 43 F.R.D. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); 
Hamilton v. Bogorad, Klein, Schuwolf, Masciovecchio, 275 S.2d 41 (Fla. App. 1973). 
116. See Jones v. Lindsey, 114 Cal. App. 2d 237, 250 P.2d 153 (1952); Miller v. 
Holzhauser, 19 Misc. 2d 619, 192 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
117. See Hom v. Intelectron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Elling-
ton v. Milne, 14 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.N.C. 1953); Eldridge v. Jagger, 83 Ariz. 150, 317 
P.2d 942 (1957); Rossten v. Wolf, 14 Ill. App. 2d 322, 144 N.E.2d 757 (1957); 
Gurwitz v. Vim Blee. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 890, 172 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup, Ct. 1958); 
Townsend v. Carolina Coach Co., 231 N.C. 81, 56 S.E.2d 39 (1949). 
118. See Detelich v. Mayo's R & A Clothing, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 788, 304 N.Y.S.2d 
67 (Sup. Ct. 1969); General Crane Serv., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 27 
Misc. 2d 403, 208 N.Y.S.2d 244 (Sup. Ct. 1960). 
119. See Saltzman v. Birrell, 156 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Pierson v. 
Fischer, 131 Cal. App. 2d 208, 280 P.2d 491 (1955); Hiltbrand v. Hiltbrand, 218 
Cal. 321, 23 P.2d 277 (1932); Bunnell v. Holmes, 64 Colo. 345, 171 P. 365 (1918); 
Fullen v. Wunderlich, 54 Colo. 349, 130 P. 1007 (1913). 
120. See Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937). See also 
Fox, supra note 2, at 185. 
121. See Morrissey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, 106 (M.D.N.C. 1956), A 
defendant's contention that he was unaware of the gravity of the situation when he 
refused service by mail does not constitute inadvertence or excusable neglect, See 
Residential Reproofing Union, Local 30-B v. Mezicco, 55 F.R.D. 516 (E.D. Pa. 
1972). A defendant's only acceptable excuse would be that an unauthorized third 
party refused his mail without his knowledge. See Wax v. Van Marter, 124 Pa. 
Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937). 
122. See Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969); Butner v, Neustadter 
324 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1963); Wolfsohn v. Raab, 11 F.R.D. 254 (E.D. Pa. 1951): 
Dann v. Gumbiner, 29 Ill. App. 2d 374, 173 N.E.2d 525 (1961). Some courts hav~ 
imposed a duty upon the defendant to monitor mail in transit after he has received 
service and sent it to a third party. See Robinson v. Bantam Books, 49 F.R.D. 139 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Texas Indein. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 271 S.W. 134 (Tex, Civ. App. 
1925). 
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various situations, courts also consider the amount of prejudice the 
delay has caused the plaintiff, 123 the amount of money involved, 124 
and whether the default is primarily technical.125 
In addition to showing an acceptable excuse for default, the 
defendant must demonstrate a meritorious defense to the plaintiff's 
claim.126 While the standards for testing the merits of a defense 
are not stringent, the passage of time may weaken the defendant's 
case and thereby lessen his chance of succeeding on the motion. 
The two statutory and constitutional requirements for jurisdiction 
-that plaintiff use due diligence in finding defendant's address and 
use care in addressing the letter-together with the motion for ex-
cusable neglect, provide substantial protection for a defendant. If 
a plaintiff complies with the jurisdictional requisites, the chances are 
extremely high that the defendant will receive the process unless he 
has moved from his last known address without leaving a forwarding 
address with the post office, with his employer, with a neighbor, or 
with the new resident of his home. It thus seems fair to say that 
a defendant who receives no actual notice of proceedings instituted 
against him, notwithstanding substantial statutory compliance by the 
plaintiff, is more to blame for that lack of notice than the plaintiff. 
Even in such an instance, the defendant can set aside the judgment 
for excusable neglect and present his defenses. The cost to the 
defendant, therefore, is only that he litigate a possibly stale cause 
of action. The benefit to the plaintiff is the assurance that, if he 
complies with the service-by-mail statute, he will not lose his cause 
of action. Finally, a plaintiff is unlikely to fail deliberately to comply 
with the two jurisdictional requirements since, if he fails to comply, 
the defendant can dismiss the judgment for lack of jurisdiction and, 
if the statute of limitations has expired, thereby preclude the 
plaintiff from recommencing his suit. 
In light of these protections, there is little need for a return-
receipt requirement. Courts sitting in nonretum-receipt states have 
uniformly held that service by mail that is refused by the defendant 
provides the defendant with a "reasonable probability" of actual 
notice127 and thus can be set aside only for excusable neglect-the 
123. Prejudice to the plaintiff may include loss of evidence resulting from delay, 
difficulty of discovery, fraud, additional costs, and other unreasonable burdens. See 
generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 27, at§ 2699. 
124. See Hutton v. Fisher, 359 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1966); Tozer v. Charles A. 
Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1961); Bridoux v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 
214 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
125. See Ciccarello v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 1 F.R.D. 491 (S.D. W. Va. 
1940). 
126. See note 110 supra. 
127. The filing of a return receipt by a plaintiff is not a constitutional require-
ment of due process, Spur v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 432 (D. Md. 1960), 
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same result reached in return-receipt states. The two approaches 
differ with regard to process-bearing letters that are unclaimed or 
unforwardable. Courts in return-receipt jurisdictions conclude that 
neither complies substantially with the return-receipt requirement. 
Courts in nonreturn-receipt jurisdictions generally search for the 
reason that the process was unclaimed or unforwardable: If the 
plaintiff failed to use due diligence, the court lacks jurisdiction; if 
the plaintiff did all that can reasonably be expected of him, the judg-
ment stands unless the defendant can show that he in fact lacked 
actual notice or, for some other excusable reason, failed to plead or 
otherwise defend. 128 
The excusable neglect motion available to the defendant op-
erates fairly: no deserving defendant can be denied the motion 
without a reversible abuse of discretion by the trial court,120 the avail-
ability of the motion depends on the degree of the defendant's culp-
ability and thereby discourages fraudulent evasive conduct, and the 
grant of the defendant's motion opens judgment to immediate trial 
and service by refused mail satisfies the constitutional due process standards, Wax v. 
Van Marter, 124 Pa. Super. 573, 189 A. 537 (1937). 
128. The distinction is that a plaintiff in a nonretum-receipt state who uses 
reasonable diligence to locate and serve the defendant cannot lose his claim to a 
successful jurisdictional attack. At best, the defendant can avail himself of the 
excusable neglect motion to open judgment. 
The few nonretum-receipt cases dealing with unclaimed mail have held that it 
satisfies constitutional due process requirements and thereby vests the court with 
jurisdiction. In Barrie-Peter Pan Schools, Inc. v. Cudmore, 261 Md. 408, 421, 276 
A.2d 74, 81 (1971), the court concluded: 
It clearly appears that legitimate efforts were made to notify the defendant cor-
poration of this action and that those efforts were by means reasonably calcu-
lated to bring the attention of the corporation to the pendency of the proceeding. 
We do not regard the failure of the corporation to claim from the post office 
the notice admittedly sent to it by the Department as invalidating what under 
these circumstances was an otherwise valid service of process. 
See also Koukal v. Coy, 219 Ore. 414, 347 P.2d 602 (1959). It is also clear from the 
cases that service by unforwardable mail satisfies constitutional due process require-
ments. See Halliman v. Stiles, 250 Ark. 249, 464 S.W.2d 573 (1971); Sommers v. 
Gaston, - Del.-, 295 A.2d 578 (Super. Ct. 1972); Swift v. Leasure, - Del.-, 
285 A.2d 428 (Super. Ct. 1971); Mitchell v. Second Judicial Dist, Ct., 82 Nev. 377, 
418 P.2d 994 (1966). 
129. See Railway Express Agency v. Jansen, 351 P.2d 1071, 1076 (Okla. 1960); 
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 417, 303 P.2d 995, 996 (1956). The cases 
indicate that whenever a defendant defaults because he innocently or excusably failed 
to receive notice of a pending action, his motion to vacate judgment for excusable 
neglect should be granted, and denial of the motion abuses the trial court's discretion. 
See Mitrovich v. Lipovic, 27 III. App. 2d 302, 169 N.E.2d 598 (1960); Morabito v. 
Champion Swimming Pool, 18 App. Div. 2d 706, 236 N.Y.S.2d 130 (1962), Some 
courts have indicated a willingness to set default judgments aside where defendants 
received timely notice of the action but negligently and excusably failed to plead or 
defend. Gore v. Witt, 11 Cal. App. 2d 728, 308 P.2d 770 (1957) (excusable neglect 
of attorney who was misinformed of correct service date); McDowell v. Jarnagin, 56 
Ill. App. 2d 395, 206 N.E.2d 497 (1965) (reasonable reliance on insurance company 
to defend case); Eshelman Motors v. Scheftel, 231 Md. 300, 189 A.2d 818 (1963) 
(financial ability of defendant to retain counsel in time to prevent default), 
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on the merits, rather than possibly foreclosing adjudication entirely. 
The only material danger to which the defendant remains vulnerable 
in a nonreturn-receipt state is the possibility of postal mi~handling, 
since jurisdiction attaches, if at all, before receipt by the postal sys-
tem.130 This danger, however, is minimal. Very few reported cases 
involving postal mishandling have arisen, and, in all instances, courts 
granted motions for excusable neglect where the defendant's lack of 
notice was innocent or excusably negligent.131 
The requirement of a signed return receipt makes actual notice 
necessary to vest a court with jurisdiction over the defendant. Since 
mail returned unclaimed or unforwardable may confer jurisdiction 
under Mullane's principles, the requirement of a signed return 
receipt is undeniably extra-constitutional. And, as we have seen, the 
requirement is unnecessary and a hindrance to the equitable resolu-
tion of all legitimate claims. The requirement gives a defendant a 
jurisdictional attack, notwithstanding the plaintiffs compliance with 
Mullane, where he would otherwise have to rely on the excusable 
neglect motion to open a default judgment. The excusable neglect 
motion is considerably more appropriate since it does not force the 
plaintiff to recommence his action. While an excusable neglect 
motion may force a defendant to litigate a stale claim, most state 
legislatures apparently have decided that this burden does not justify 
the enactment of a return-receipt provision. 
The argument against the return-receipt requirement does not 
suggest that service-by-mail statutes should never impose extra-
constitutional burdens on plaintiffs. Many requirements, such as the 
use of registered or certified mail and the requirement that the plain-
tiff file an affidavit of compliance as a prerequisite to jurisdiction, 
are necessary to protect defendants and do not overburden plaintiffs. 
But the imposition of extra-constitutional burdens with which a 
plaintiff may be unable to comply unduly penalizes a plaintiff for 
innocent conduct and serves no deterrent purpose. Instead, the ex-
cusable neglect motion should be allowed to perform its function of 
putting two innocent or excusably negligent parties where they would 
have been had all proceeded properly from the start: in court, 
conducting trial on the merits. 
130. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 319" (1950) 
(by implication). 
131. See Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1970) (mail truck burned, 
defendant's motion denied only because he lacked a meritorious defense); Miller v. 
F.M.W. Drilling Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 728, 295 P.2d 412 (1956) (letter either lost in 
mails or misaddressed}; Dann v. Gumbiner, 29 Ill. App. 2d 374, 173 N.E.2d 525 
(1961) (process lost in regular mails). 
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